Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations

To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given society. Part I considers theories about the impact of growing social diversity in Western nations. We classify two categories of society: ORIGINS (defined as Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, including twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (defined as Western Countries of Destination for Muslim migrants, including twenty?two OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations). Using this framework, we demonstrate that on average, the basic social values of Muslim migrants fall roughly mid?way between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination. We conclude that Muslim migrants do not move to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host culture, as assimilation theories suggest.

The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies

A transformation of basic political priorities may be taking place in Western Europe. I hypothesize: (1) that people have a variety of needs which are given high or low priority according to their degree of fulfillment: people act on behalf of their most important unsatisfied need, giving relatively little attention to needs already satisfied—except that (2) people tend to retain the value priorities adopted in their formative years throughout adult life. In contemporary Western Europe, needs for physical safety and economic security are relatively well satisfied for an unprecedentedly large share of the population. Younger, more affluent groups have been formed entirely under these conditions, and seem relatively likely to give top priority to fulfillment of needs which remain secondary to the older and less affluent majority of the population. Needs for belonging and intellectual and esthetic self-fulfillment (characterized as "post-bourgeois” values) may take top priorities among the former group. Survey data from six countries indicate that the value priorities of the more affluent postwar group do contrast with those of groups raised under conditions of lesser economic and physical security. National patterns of value priorities correspond to the given nation's economic history, moreover, suggesting that the age-group differences reflect the persistence of preadult experiences, rather than life cycle effects. The distinctive value priorities imply distinctive political behavior—being empirically linked with preferences for specific political issues and political parties in a predictable fashion. If the respective age cohorts retain their present value priorities, we would expect long-term shifts in the political goals and patterns of political partisanship prevailing in these societie

The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Understanding Human Security

Since the end of the Cold War, security studies have broadened to take into account a wide range of non-military threats ranging from poverty to environmental concerns rather than just national defense. Security scholars, backed by international organizations and a growing number of national governments, have developed the concept of Human Security, focusing on the welfare of ordinary people against a broad range of threats. This has aroused vigorous debate. Part I of this paper proposes an analytical model of Human Security. Part II argues that it is important to measure how ordinary people perceive risks, moving beyond state-centric notions of Human Security. We examine new evidence, drawing upon survey items specially designed to monitor perceptions of Human Security, included for the first time in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), with fieldwork conducted in 2010-2012. Part III demonstrates that people distinguish three dimensions: national, community, and personal security and then explores some structural determinants driving these perceptions. Part IV discusses why perceptions of Human Security matter, in particular for explaining cultural values and value change around the world. The conclusion argues that the shift from a narrow focus on military security toward the broader concept of Human Security is a natural response to the changing challenges facing developed societies, in which the cost-benefit ratio concerning war has become negative and cultural changes have made war less acceptable. In this setting, valid measures of perceptions of Human Security have become essential, both to understand the determinants of Human Security among ordinary people, and to analyze their consequences.

Review of Payne Kenneth, Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/153737/1/pops12597_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/153737/2/pops12597.pd

El veritable xoc de civilitzacions

Samuel Huntington tenia raó només en part. La línia de fractura cultural que divideix el món occidental del món musulmà no fa referència a la democràcia sinó al gènere. Segons un nou estudi, els musulmans i els seus homòlegs occidentals volen la democràcia; tanmateix, es tracta de móns molt separats pel que fa a les seves actituds vers el divorci, l’avortament, la igualtat de gènere i els drets dels homosexuals, cosa que no fa presagiar res de bo per al futur de la democràcia a l’Orient Mitjà

Human development as a general theory of social change: A multi-level and cross-cultural perspective

This paper demonstrates that socioeconomic development, cultural modernization, and democratic regime performance constitute a coherent syndrome of social change'a syndrome whose common focus has not properly been specified by standard modernization theory. We specify this syndrome as Human Development, arguing that its three components have a common focus on individual choice. Socioeconomic development broadens individual choice by giving people more resources; cultural modernization gives rise to aspirations that lead people to seek for individual choice; and democracy extends individual choice by codifying legal opportunities. Analysis of data from 80 societies demonstrates: (1) that a universal resource-aspiration-opportunity syndrome is present at the individual, national and supra-national levels across 80 nations and 8 cultural zones; (2) that this Human Development syndrome is endogenously shaped by a causal effect from resources and aspirations on opportunities; and (3) that elite integrity or good governance is a strong exogenous determinant of the Human Development syndrome as a whole. -- Das vorliegende Papier zeigt, dass sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung, kulturelle Modernisierung und demokratische Regimeperformanz ein kohärentes Syndrom sozialen Wandels bilden - ein Syndrom, dessen integrierender Kern von der klassischen Modernisierungstheorie nicht hinreichend spezifiziert wurde. Wir spezifizieren diesen Kern mit dem Konzept der Humanentwicklung. Wir argumentieren, dass die drei Komponenten der Humanentwicklung dahingehend zusammenwirken, dass sie die individuelle Optionsvielfalt steigern. Sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung erweitert Optionen, indem sie den Individuen mehr Ressourcen verleiht; kulturelle Modernisierung mobilisiert Ansprüche, die die Individuen nach Optionsvielfalt streben lassen; und Demokratie sichert Optionen durch rechtliche Garantien. Eine Analyse der Weltwertestudien zeigt, dass es (1) einen universellen Nexus aus Ressourcen, Ansprüchen und Garantien gibt, der sich auf der individuellen, nationalen und supra-nationalen Ebene über 80 Gesellschaften und 8 Kulturzonen nachweisen lässt; (2) dass die endogene Genese dieses Syndroms der Humanentwicklung durch kausale Effekte von Ressourcen und Ansprüchen auf Garantien zustande kommt; und (3) dass regelkonformes Elitenverhalten eine exogene Determinante dieses Syndroms insgesamt ist.

Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations

To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given society. Part I considers theories about the impact of growing social diversity in Western nations. We classify two categories of society: ORIGINS (defined as Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, including twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (defined as Western Countries of Destination for Muslim migrants, including twenty-two OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations). Using this framework, we demonstrate that on average, the basic social values of Muslim migrants fall roughly mid-way between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination. We conclude that Muslim migrants do not move to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host culture, as assimilation theories suggest

Human development and the "explosion" of democracy: variations of regime change across 60 societies

"Recently scholars identified a global 'explosion' of democracy as a sharply distinctive period within Huntington's Third Wave of democratization. So far the role of modernization has not been analyzed with particular regard to this outstanding phase of democratization. Given that modernization has economic as well as cultural aspects, we test two prominent theses. First, we test Przeworski/ Limongiżs claim that transitions to democracy do not derive from economic modernization. Using a graded measure of regime change, we present evidence to the contrary. Second, we test Inglehart's finding that modern mass attitudes play a negligable role in promoting regime change to democracy. To the contrary again, we show that one aspect of cultural modernization, mass-level liberty aspirations, has a positive impact on democratic change - even stronger than economic modernization. Third, we unfold the concept of Human Development to establish a more general argument on the causal mechanism in the modernization-democratization nexus. Our data cover 60 societies of the World Values Surveys, representing nearly 50 per cent of all regime changes in the world since 1972." (author's abstract)"Jüngere Forschungsarbeiten haben eine globale 'Explosion' der Demokratie identifiziert, die eine scharf eingegrenzte Periode innerhalb Huntingtons breiterer Definition der Dritten Demokratisierungswelle bildet. Mit Blick auf diese hervorstechende Demokratisierungsphase ist die Rolle von Modernisierungsfaktoren bisher noch nicht untersucht worden. Ausgehend davon, dass Modernisierung ökonomische und kulturelle Aspekte hat, prüfen die Autoren zwei prominente Thesen. Zunächst testen sie Przeworski/ Limongis Behauptung, dass Regimewechsel zur Demokratie nicht von ökonomischer Modernisierung befördert werden. Unter Verwendung eines kontinuierlichen Maßes für Regimewechsel kommen die Autoren zu einem gegenteiligen Ergebnis. Zum zweiten testen sie Ingleharts Befund, dass moderne Einstellungen der Bürger ebenfalls keine positive Wirkung auf Regimewechsel zur Demokratie hätten. Im Gegensatz auch zu diesem Befund kommen die Autoren zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein wesentlicher Aspekt kultureller Modernisierung, nämlich die Verbreitung von Freiheitsansprüchen, sehr wohl einen positiven Effekt auf Regimewechsel zur Demokratie hat - mehr noch sogar als ökonomische Modernisierung. Zum dritten entfalten die Autoren das Konzept der Humanentwicklung, um ein generelleres Verständnis der Wirkungszusammenhänge im Modernisierungs-Demokratisierungs-Nexus zu etablieren. Ihre Daten decken 60 Gesellschaften aus den Weltwertestudien ab, auf die fast 50 Prozent aller Regimewechsel entfallen, die seit 1972 weltweit aufgetreten sind." (Autorenreferat

Individualism, Autonomy and Self-Expression: The Human Development Syndrome

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/89924/1/inglehart__oyserman__2004.pd

North American Convergence, Revisited

This article revisits previous surveys regarding value changes in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The earlier evaluation showed that a convergence of values among these North American nations was occurring. This most recent study confirms that trend in several areas (though national and regional distinctions remain), contradicting other predictions to the contrary. Whether one is afraid of change or is eager for it, this study indicates that all three North American countries are, inevitably, experiencing that change.Este artículo revisa encuestas previas sobre el cambio de valores en Canadá, México y Estados Unidos. La evaluación anterior había mostrado que existía una convergencia de valores entre estas tres naciones norteamericanas. Este estudio, más reciente, confirma que esa tendencia, aun con sus diferencias nacionales y regionales, se mantiene, lo que contradice las predicciones de que sucedería lo opuesto. Independientemente de si se teme o se desea que dicho cambio suceda, el estudio indica que los tres países de Norteamérica lo están experimentando de manera inevitable